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Abstract—This paper presents a countermeasure mechanism
for the propagation of fast network worm malware. The mechan-
ism uses a cross layer architecture with a detection technique at
the network layer to identify worm infection and a data-link con-
tainment solution to block an identified infected host. A software
prototype of the mechanism has been used to demonstrate its
effective. An empirical analysis of network worm propagation has
been conducted to test the mechanism. The results show that the
developed mechanism is effective in containing self-propagating
malware with almost no false positives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has provided a medium for communication
and sharing of information amongst people, businesses, gov-
ernments and organisations. Therefore the Internet must be
kept continuous and secured from any form of malicious
activities such as unauthorised access to computer system and
malware attacks. Malicious software (malware) is a generic
term for any software that enters a computer system without
the authorisation of the user to perform unwanted actions
[1]. Malware can be classified under a number of headings,
including viruses, worms, trojans, spyware, adware, rootkits,
drive-by downloads and other malicious and unwanted soft-
ware. Self-propagating malware, termed a worm, is a ma-
licious software program that propagates across a network
by infecting hosts and in some cases launching malicious
activities. A scanning network worm propagates by probing
pseudo-random addresses looking for vulnerable hosts, which
makes the malware highly virulent in nature. Fast scanning
network worms are a particularly dangerous sub-class of such
software.
The Internet has experienced a number of notable worm
outbreaks that caused disruption of services [2], damage to
targeted systems [3], cyber espionage [4] and financial losses
ranging from millions to billions of US Dollars [5]. Common
countermeasures to worm infection are signature-based anti-
virus software, network intrusion detection systems and host
intrusion detection systems. However, the ability of such
systems to counter the effects of fast scanning network worms
is limited because their high propagation and infection rates
pose a significant security threat, with consequent damage to
networks and the Internet. Thus it is important to effectively
identify and counter the propagation of worms, particularly
fast scanning network worms, using a mechanism that must
first work without the need to rely on signatures (sequence
of byte-stream), because methods which rely on content
signatures are unlikely to detect zero-day network worms.
Additionally, due to the high propagation rates of fast scanning
network worms, the traditional approach of waiting for patches
to be released by vendors to fix vulnerabilities is not viable.
This paper presents an advance cross-layer detection and
containment technique as an improvement over the NEDAC
mechanism reported in [2]. The NEDAC mechanism uses
datagram-header information at the network layer to detect the
presence of fast scanning worms and a containment solution
at data-link layer to block outgoing traffic from a host that
has been identified as infected. The rest of the paper is
organised as follows. Section 2 summarises related work on
worm detection and containment systems. Section 3 presents
a description of the NEDAC mechanism. Section 4 presents
the evaluation method used to test the NEDAC mechanism.
Section 5 presents the experiments conducted and Section
6 presents a discussion of the experimental results obtained.
Section 7 concludes this paper and points out possible future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
A range of anomaly-based network intrusion detection sys-
tems have been developed to identify the presence of worms
using datagram header information and payload information
[6].
Gu et al. [7] developed an algorithm, termed DSC, that
correlates incoming and outgoing traffic, i.e., if a host received
a datagram on port i, and then starts sending datagrams
destined for port i, it becomes a suspect. Jung et al. [8]
proposed an algorithm, termed TRW, which identifies a remote
host attempt to establish a new TCP connection to a local
destination as normal if there is a corresponding TCP reply. On
the other hand, failure to establish a successful TCP connection
is considered suspicious. Weaver et al. [9] simplified the TRW
scheme by considering all new connections to be a failure
until a response is received. The algorithm drops a datagram
if it does not match an existing and successfully-established
connection after a predefined threshold count. Whyte et al.
[10] used DNS-based rate limiting to suppress scanning worms
in an enterprise network by identifying the absence of DNS
resolution before a new connection as anomalous. Shahzad
and Woodhead [11] proposed a scheme that uses the absence
of DNS lookup action prior to an outgoing TCP SYN or
UDP datagram to a new destination IP address to detect worm
propagation, and a protocol termed Friends to spread reports
of an identified worm event to potentially vulnerable and
uninfected peer networks within the scheme. Li and Stafford
[12] proposed a worm detector, which they termed SWORD.
SWORD comprises two main modules; a Burst Duration
Detector (BDD) and a Quiescent Period Detector (QPD).
The BDD module encompasses a burst detection algorithm
to prevent fast scanning worms by creating a window for
every different size of first-contact connections. The QPD
module ensures that quiescent periods in network activity
do not disappear because of constant worm scanning. These
techniques consume resources in order to keep track of distinct
connection and host information, especially in large networks
[13], and they can only slow worm infections [2].
Additionally, Wang and Stolfo [14] and Kim et al. [15]
proposed payload-based anomaly detection schemes. Wang
and Stolfo [14] proposed a detection scheme known as PAYL
to detect and generate signatures for zero-day worms. PAYL
uses a training phase to create a profile during normal oper-
ation, and produces a byte frequency distribution as a model
for normal payloads. Based on this information, a centroid
model is created and then during the detection phase, the
Mahalanobis distance of each datagram payload from the
centroid model is calculated. A datagram is considered to be
anomalous based on its distance from the normal behaviour.
Kim et al. [15] proposed a detection scheme using a standalone
device. The scheme employed the detection method reported
by Kim et al. in [16]. During the training phase, the mean
and standard deviation scores for all datagrams are computed.
In the detection phase, a score is computed by counting the
number of datagram bytes that fall outside the range defined
for each byte. These mechanisms have limitations such as
computational complexity [17], management overhead [18],
high rates of false positives [13] and incur significant delays
in deployment and detection [15].
III. THE NEDAC MECHANISM
The NEDAC mechanism comprises a network layer detec-
tion system and a containment system at the data-link layer
that work together to provide a countermeasure solution, with
a connection maintained between the two systems to enable
continuous data transmission. The detection system detects
anomalies from client hosts and server hosts in a network
using different techniques. The detection system maintains
a list of server IP addresses in order to differentiate client
and server hosts in a network. Client hosts are defined as
network hosts which typically consume Internet services (e.g.
workstations, laptops, tablets, smart-phones, etc) while server
hosts are network hosts used to serve client requests (e.g. web
servers and email servers). The detection system keeps track
of inbound and outbound TCP SYN and UDP datagrams for
a window of time with value T to determine anomalies that
exceed a threshold. The threshold is a maximum allowable
count of anomalous datagrams a host can send before T has
elapsed. The containment system receives the MAC address
of an identified infected host from the detection system and
then blocks all traffic originating from the host using MAC
address access control. The working mechanism of NEDAC
is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The NEDAC detection and containment system
1: Begin
2: /* Initialize tables */
3: initializeTable(inboundTable)
4: initilaizeTable(resolutionTable)
5: initilaizeTable(noResolutionTable)
6: /* initialize exempt table*/
7: initializeTable(exemptTable)
8: /* Set timer */
9: T = SetTimerSignal()
10: /* open interface */
11: openInterface(interface)
12: /* do in parallel */ process 1
13: while (there are datagrams to process) do
14: getDatagram()
15: uniqueMAC = getMACAddress(datagram)
16: headerInfo = getHeaderInfo(srcIP,dstIP,sPort,dPort)
17: if datagram is inbound then
18: if packet is DNS reply then
19: updateResolutionTable()
20: else
21: updateInboundTable(dstIP)
22: updateInboundTable(dPort)
23: end if
24: else
25: if headerInfo is not found in exemptTable[] then
26: if source host not a server then
27: if IP addresses not in resolutionTable then
28: updateNoResolutionTable(headerInfo)
29: if (dPortCounter > threshold) then
30: containHost(MAC)
31: if dPort in inboundTable then
32: blockInbound(dPort)
33: end if
34: end if
35: else
36: getNextDatagram()
37: end if
38: else
39: correlate(headerInfo)
40: if dport in inboundTable then
41: updateInboundTable(headerInfo)
42: end if
43: if (dPortCounter > threshold) then
44: containHost(MAC)
45: if dport in inboundTable then
46: blockInbound(dPort)
47: end if
48: end if
49: end if
50: else
51: getNextDatagram()
52: end if
53: end if
54: end while
55: /* do in parallel */ process 2
56: while true do
57: if (T generates timeout signal) then
58: for entries in resolutionTable do
59: if (TTL >= 86400) then
60: delete entry
61: end if
62: end for
63: for entries in noResolutionTable and inboundTable do
64: if (TTL >= 60) then
65: delete entry
66: end if
67: halveThresholds()
68: end for
69: end if
70: end while
71: End
The NEDAC algorithm monitors TCP SYN and UDP data-
grams from hosts in a network. For client hosts, the algorithm
observes DNS resolution datagrams and records the IP address
of the host that made the resolution and the resolved address
in the resolution table. The destination IP address and port of
an inbound datagram (excluding a DNS reply) is recorded in
the inbound table for both client and server hosts. Outgoing
datagram header information (source IP addresses and ports)
is associated to entries in an exempt table. The exempt table
comprises a list of IP addresses and ports that are exempt from
the algorithm. If the header information results in a miss, the
algorithm determines whether there is a recent DNS query by
a client host for the destination IP address prior to sending
the datagram by checking the resolution cache. If there is
a miss, the algorithm records the destination port in the no-
resolution cache, increments its counter and then determines
excess using the threshold with value V . For server hosts,
the algorithm checks the presence of the destination port of
outbound TCP SYN and UDP datagrams in the inbound table.
If there is a hit, a counter for such entry is incremented for
TCP datagrams. An additional verification of the destination
IP address is made to determine a reply UDP datagram, and
if the destination IP address does not match the IP address
recorded for such entry in the inbound table, its counter is
incremented and then excess in threshold is also determined.
Upon a host exceeding the set threshold, the algorithm invokes
the containment system and then checks the presence of the
suspect port in the inbound cache. If there is a hit, an additional
countermeasure is applied at the network layer using an access
control list (ACL) to block all inbound datagrams destined for
the suspect port in the network segment. A time-to-live (TTL)
is provided for entries in all the caches. The default TTL value
for DNS (86400 seconds) is applied to the resolution cache and
60 seconds is applied to the no-resolution and inbound caches.
Furthermore, the algorithm decrements the counters in the no-
resolution and inbound tables by half after the expiration of a
timing window of T , and then checks all caches to determine
and remove entries with expired TTL values.
The improvements of the countermeasure mechanism on the
previous technique in [2] are (1) separate detection techniques
for client and server hosts to improve effectiveness of the
system (2) an additional countermeasure mechanism for in-
bound worm traffic to block remote to local worm infection
and (3) time-to-live for records maintained in caches to reduce
excessive resource consumption.
IV. EVALUATION PROCEDURE
To evaluate the proposed mechanism, a software prototype
was developed and tested using worm propagation experiments
in a controlled environment. The NEDAC mechanism was
tested along with two previously reported worm detection
techniques namely DSC and DNS-based detection schemes.
The schemes were also implemented in software based on the
description provided by their authors. The DNS-based scheme
was termed DNS-RL.
The testing environment used for the evaluation process is
a virtualised testbed described in [19]. The testbed contains
four virtualised enterprise networks comprising a number of
virtual network cells. The testbed has a scale of 1200 virtual
machines, supports the use of worm daemons and has utilities
for replaying network traces as background traffic. To generate
background traffic during the worm propagation experiments,
the evaluation used the DARPA 1999 evaluation dataset [20].
The “inside” traces of weeks 1 and 3 of the dataset meet
the requirements of the evaluation because they are attack
free traces that contain payload information for the variety
of protocols needed. Additionally, the traces include a wide
range of collected traffic from 31 network hosts.
The evaluation process used two contemporary pseudo-
worms that were developed based on the Microsoft RDP
(CVE-2012-0002) vulnerability [21] of 2012 and the Shell-
Shock vulnerability [22] of 2014. Ahmad and Woodhead [2]
reported the likely susceptible population values and potential
datagram sizes of the Microsoft RDP and ShellShock vulner-
abilities as circa 16.5M and 3800 bytes and 42.5k and 2000
bytes respectively.
Additionally, the bandwidth available for an infected host
and the worm datagram size determine how fast a worm can
send datagrams. The average Internet connection speed was
estimated to be within the range 10 Mbps to 1000 Mbps
[23]. Although it is impossible for a host to achieve the
maximum speed of a network card, the vast majority of
Internet connected hosts are capable of transmitting data at 60
Mbps to 120Mbps [24]. Thus based on the assumption that the
Internet connected hosts exhibit an average data transmission
rate of 90 Mbps, the scan rate S, required for a single worm
instance to transmit a datagram of size M (in bytes), over a
C megabits Internet connection per second can be determined
using S = C(M∗8) . Therefore, the likely scan rates for the
RDP and ShellShock pseudo-worms are
(
90,000,000
3800∗8
)
= 2960
and
(
90,000,000
2000∗8
)
= 5625 datagrams per second respectively.
The scan rates of the pseudo-worms were scaled down by
a factor of 24 and 45 for the RDP and ShellShock pseudo-
worms respectively to avoid overloading server resources. The
resulting scan rates employed in the experiments are 125
“infectious” datagrams per second for RDP and ShellShock.
Furthermore, the results of the experiments were scaled up by
a factor of 24 and 45 for the RDP and ShellShock pseudo-
worms respectively.
Ahmad and Woodhead [2] reported the number of suscept-
ible hosts per million Internet hosts for RDP and ShellShock
pseudo-worms as 4454 and 12 respectively. Thus, due to the
scale of the testbed used, which has a maximum number of
1200 hosts, four class B size
(
2
16
)
networks were used for
RDP and five class A size
(
2
24
)
networks were used for Shell-
Shock. Thus, the resulting values were
[(
2
16
)
∗ 4 ∗
(
4454
1000000
)]
= 1168 and
[(
2
24
)
∗ 5 ∗
(
12
1000000
)]
= 1007 susceptible hosts
respectively, within the relevant network address space.
V. EXPERIMENTATION SETUP
The evaluation experiments were conducted using the soft-
ware prototypes of NEDAC DSC and DNS-RL. During the
evaluation, a prototype of a detection scheme was positioned
on the gateways of each network, and for NEDAC, the contain-
ment system was positioned on the switches as depicted in Fig.
1. RDP and ShellShock worm propagation experiments were
conducted using random and then hit-list scanning behaviours
for each detection scheme. The random scanning technique
probes IPv4 addresses within the routable address space.
The hit-list scanning technique infects a list of pre-compiled
vulnerable hosts and then each infected host uses random
scanning.
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Fig. 1: Prototype setup
For each pseudo-worm experiment, a number of hosts (1168
for RDP and 1007 for ShellShock) were configured with the
correct daemon to make them vulnerable to worm attack data-
grams while other hosts were configured to replay the DARPA
traces as background traffic. The worm attack and traffic replay
events were executed concurrently in each experiment. The
experiments were conducted without any countermeasures in
place, then repeated with the countermeasures and the DARPA
dataset as background traffic using threshold values of 100
through 400 anomalous datagrams sent by a host in a timing
window of 10 seconds. The worm infection event was initiated
by sending a UDP datagram to one of the vulnerable hosts.
A. RDP Pseudo-worm
The RDP pseudo-worm experiment was conducted using
1160 client hosts and 8 server hosts. The pseudo-worm dae-
mon was configured to listen on UDP port 3389 and then
transmit UDP datagrams to port 3389 at a scan rate of 125
“infectious” datagrams per second, once “infected”. Five RDP
pseudo-worm experiments were conducted using one initially
infected host. Fig. 2 shows the average result of the five
experiments.
The RDP-based worm experiment was repeated with a hit-
list [25] of 10 and 20 hosts. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the results
of RDP pseudo-worm propagation using hit-lists of 10 and 20
hosts.
B. ShellShock Pseudo-worm
The ShellShock pseudo-worm experiment was conducted
using 996 client hosts and 10 server hosts. The pseudo-worm
daemon was configured to listen on UDP port 8080 and
then transmit UDP datagrams to port 8080 at a scan rate of
125 “infectious” datagrams per second, once “infected”. Five
ShellShock pseudo-worm experiments were conducted using
one initially infected host. Fig. 5 shows the average result of
the five experiments.
As with RDP, the ShellShock worm experiment was re-
peated with a hit-list [25] of 10 and 20 hosts. Fig. 6 and Fig.
7 show the results of RDP pseudo-worm propagation using
hit-lists of 10 and 20 hosts.
VI. DISCUSSION
The section discusses the infection behaviours of the can-
didate pseudo-worms using random and hit-list scanning and
the false positives observed during the experiments.
A. Random Scanning Infection
The results of random infection behaviours for the RDP
and ShellShock pseudo-worms using a threshold value of 100
are presented in Fig. 2 and Fig. 5. When no countermeasure
solution was in place, the RDP pseudo-worm infected 95%
(1110) of the hosts in eight seconds as shown in Fig. 2.
Additionally, the ShellShock pseudo-worm infected 95% (956)
of its susceptible hosts in 145 seconds as shown in Fig. 5.
When the detection schemes were applied, the infections were
delayed and suppressed by DSC and DNS-RL and blocked
completely by NEDAC. With DSC and DNS-RL, the RDP
pseudo-worm infection was delayed by 12 seconds and sup-
pressed to 44% (510) and 50% (580) respectively. The worm
infections were detected by the DSC and DNS-RL schemes
and the countermeasure solution was applied, but the initially
infected host continued sending infectious datagrams, which
infected a large number of hosts. However, with NEDAC,
the initially infected host, for each pseudo-worm experiment,
was detected and then blocked from sending out datagrams
at the data-link layer, which stopped the infection completely
for each of the two worm outbreak scenarios. Additionally,
the NEDAC scheme blocked inbound traffic destined for the
destination port used by the identified worm infection at the
network layer, which also enable the mechanism to contain
the worm infection quickly.
B. Hit-list Scanning Infection
Fig. 3 and Fig. 6 show the results of the worm experiments
conducted with a hit-list of 10 hosts. When no countermeasure
was in place, the RDP pseudo-worm infected 95% (1110) of
the hosts in 6 seconds as shown in Fig. 3. The ShellShock
pseudo-worm attained 95% (956) infection in 55 seconds as
shown in Fig. 6.
With the DSC and DNS-RL scheme, the RDP pseudo-
worm infection attained 95% in 19 and 15 seconds respect-
ively. The ShellShock pseudo-worm attained 95% infection
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Fig. 2: RDP random scanning
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Fig. 3: RDP with a hit-list of 10 hosts
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Fig. 4: RDP with a hit-list of 20 hosts
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Fig. 5: ShellShock random scanning
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Fig. 6: ShellShock with a hit-list of 10 hosts
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Fig. 7: ShellShock with a hit-list of 20 hosts
   









	
	




















 
!"
Fig. 8: False positive rate for RDP experiment
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Fig. 9: False positive rate for ShellShock experiment
in 150 and 100 seconds with DSC and DNS-RL respect-
ively. Furthermore, nine further infections were observed with
NEDAC during the RDP pseudo-worm propagation and no
further infections were observed during the propagation of the
ShellShock pseudo-worm.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 7 show the results of the worm experiments
conducted with a hit-list of 20 hosts. When no countermeasure
was in place, the RDP pseudo-worm infected 95% (1004) of
the hosts in 5 seconds as shown in Fig. 4. The ShellShock
pseudo-worm attained 95% infection in 40 seconds as shown
in Fig. 7. Furthermore, with the DSC and DNS-RL scheme,
the RDP pseudo-worm infection attained 95% in 11 and 9
seconds respectively. The ShellShock pseudo-worm attained
95% infection in 90 and 75 seconds with DSC and DNS-
RL respectively. For NEDAC, 56 further infections were
observed during the RDP pseudo-worm propagation and no
further infections were observed during the propagation of the
ShellShock pseudo-worm.
C. Detection Performance
The false positive rates observed by the three detection
schemes are presented in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 for the RDP
and ShellShock pseudo-worm experiments respectively. The
schemes detected all real pseudo-worm datagrams in all the ex-
periments conducted and therefore the true positive (TP) rates
are 100%. However, the DSC and DNS-RL schemes incurred
higher rates of false positives (FP) than NEDAC. NEDAC has
very low FP rates using 100 and 200 as thresholds and zero
FP rates using 300 and 400 as thresholds. Generally, the false
positive rate diminishes with rising threshold values. NEDAC
raised one false positive with threshold values of 100 and 200,
which was caused by a multicast UDP datagram sent by a host
to port 520, i.e, a RIP advertisement. Additionally, the rate at
which RIP sends updates to neighbouring routers is not similar
to fast scanning worm behaviour because RIP routers exchange
update every 30 seconds by default. Nevertheless, the RIP port
can be added into the exempt list in NEDAC to avoid false
positives. Across the whole experimental data set, NEDAC has
a better performance in terms of false positives compared to
the DNS-RL scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a countermeasure solution against
fast scanning network worms. A software prototype of the
worm countermeasure solution was used to evaluate the
scheme using a set of experiments. The results of the exper-
iments showed that the countermeasure solution is sensitive
in detecting and containing an identified worm infection
with almost no false positives. The results of a comparative
analysis showed that the countermeasure solution has a better
performance compared to two previously reported detection
schemes.
As for future work, it is desirable to evaluate the mechanism
using different background traffic. The aim of improving the
detection system to use dynamic threshold policy and the
speed of containment will also be investigated. Furthermore,
the effect of timing window size and volume of background
traffic will be investigated.
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